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NOTES
EXPROPRIATION: COMPENSATING THE LANDOWNER TO THE FULL
EXTENT OF HIS LOSS
The state highway department expropriated the entire parking
and loading area of the defendants' marina. The trial court
calculated the compensation award on the basis of the cost of con-
structing a similar area on the opposite shore of the marina's boat
slip. The First Circuit Court of Appeal, although recognizing that
the 1974 constitution had widened the scope of compensatory
damages, reduced the award to what it found to be the market value
of the land.1 The supreme court reversed and held that article I, sec-
tion 42 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 requires compensation
for any economic loss sustained by the property owner, including
the cost of replacing his business facilities. State v. Constant, 369
So. 2d 699 (La. 1979).
Historically, the standard for compensatory damages in ex-
propriation cases in Louisiana has been based on the concept of
"just compensation" embodied in the fifth amendment 3 to the United
1. State v. Constant, 359 So. 2d 666 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978)..
2. LA. CONST. art. I, § 4 provides in pertinent part:
Property shall not be taken or damaged by the state or its political subdivi-
sions except for public purposes and with just compensation paid to the owner or
into court for his benefit. Property shall not be taken or damaged by any private
entity authorized by law to expropriate, except for a public and necessary pur-
pose and with just compensation paid to the owner; in such proceedings, whether
the purpose is public and necessary shall be a judicial question. In every ex-
propriation, a party has the right to trial by jury to determine compensation, and
the owner shall be compensated to the full extent of his loss.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.
It has been held that this constitutional provision is imposed on the states by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy R.R. Co.
v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). Of course the states are free to award more than what
would be just compensation under the fifth amendment if they so desire.
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States Constitution and echoed in article I, section 2' of the Loui-
siana Constitution of 1921 as "just and adequate compensation." In
implementing the standard of just compensation, the Louisiana
courts naturally looked to the traditional limiting considerations
developed by the federal courts.' Two of these considerations which
have often been criticized as producing inadequate awards to the
landowner are the "res" concept and the overriding importance of
the need to encourage public improvements.'
The "res" concept was developed as a corollary to the pertinent
clause of the fifth amendment mandating that no "private property
be taken for public use without just compensation." The United
States Supreme Court has stated it this way: "And this just compen-
sation, it will be noticed, is for the property and not to the owner.
Every other clause in this fifth amendment is personal."' Thus the
"courts denied payment for loss or expense incurred by owners ...
incidental to the taking, if the losses were not reflected in the value
of the property taken."8
A second traditional explanation for the limitation of expropria-
tion awards reflects the resolution of the judicial balancing of the
loss to the landowner against the public need to limit the amount of
the award." When faced with this conflict, Louisiana courts have
most often denied the landowner compensation for "incidental" or
"consequential" losses"0 (that is, those damages not directly reflected
in the market value of the property), probably for fear that high ex-
propriation awards might retard essential public projects."
4. LA. CONST. of 1921, art. I, § 2 provided: "No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property, except by due process of law. Except as otherwise provided in this
Constitution, private property shall not be taken or damaged except for public pur-
poses and after just and adequate compensation is paid."
5. That is, Louisiana has adopted the market value standard with its inherent
limitations. See, e.g., State v. Hayward, 243 La. 1036, 1038, 150 So. 2d 6, 8 (1963). See
text at notes 7-12, infra.
6. See, e.g., Hershman, Eminent Domain: Current Concepts and Practical Prob-
lems, in A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE LEGAL AND APPRAISAL ASPECTS OF CONDEMNATION
3, 4 (S. Searles ed. 1969).
7. Monogahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893). For the
text of the fifth amendment, see note 3, supra.
8. Hershman, supra note 6, at 5.
9. According to the United States Supreme Court: "The law of eminent domain
is fashioned out of the conflict between people's interest in public projects and the
principle of indemnity to the landowner." United States ex rel. Tennessee Valley Auth.
v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 280 (1943).
10. See, e.g., State v. Mason, 254 La. 1035, 229 So. 2d 89 (1969); Texas Pipe Line
Co. v. Barbe, 229 La. 191, 85 So. 2d 260 (1956).
11. Hershman, supra note 6, at 5. That writer goes on to describe several common
incidental or consequential losses. These include: (1) the cost of moving personal prop-
erty and machinery, (2) the cost of searching for a new location, (3) the loss of business
[Vol. 40
NOTES
The notion of "fair market value," or simply "market value,"
was developed by the courts in response to these considerations as a
workable and limited standard for determining just compensation.
Market value is most often defined as that price most likely to be
agreed upon after free and open negotiations between a willing
seller and a willing buyer. 2 It is most often computed by the "com-
parable sales method,"'" in which the appraiser analyzes recent sales
prices of similar properties and adjusts 4 them in an effort to
estimate the value of the subject property. The comparable sales
method does make use of "market data" in its analysis, but it must
be remembered that this is only a technique for estimating market
value and does not represent market value per se. 5
Although the comparable sales method is the preferred ap-
proach," market value may also be estimated by the income
capitalization method."7 The value of the property is determined by
estimating the present value of income expected to be received in
the future. 8 The income capitalization approach is generally con-
sidered to be a theoretically sound method of appraising commercial
property 9 and is commonly used in this connection in Louisiana."
This approach does represent something of a deviation from the
"res" concept in that it implicitly recognizes that the market value
of commercial property must be determined in relation to the use to
which it has been put by the owner.
Market value may also be estimated by the use of replacement
goodwill and patronage caused by the relocation and/or interruption of a business, (4)
losses on the forced sale of movables not suited to the new location, and (5) transporta-
tion and legal expenses. Id.
12. M. DAKIN & M. KLEIN, EMINENT DOMAIN IN LOUISIANA 30-31 (1970).
13. See State v. Kornman, 336 So. 2d 220, 223-24 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976), and
cases cited therein.
14. It is this adjustment for the differences in size, layout, location, and other
qualitative variables and their effect on value that causes the most difficulty in im-
plementing the comparable sales method. Therefore, the greater the similarities be-
tween the subject property and the "comparables" the more accurate the appraisal.
See generally M. DAKIN & M. KLEIN, supra note 12, at 188-97.
15. Id. at 154-55. See text at note 12, supra.
16. M. DAKIN & M. KLEIN, supra note 12, at 181.
17. Id. at 215-22.
18. This estimation presents the greatest difficulty in applying the income
capitalization method since the appraiser must subjectively determine what rate of
return the property should earn as well as predict the future income flow. See Her-
shman, supra note 6, at 10.
19. Id
20. See, e.g., State v. Crow, 286 So. 2d 353 (La. 1973); State v. Lewis, 142 So. 2d
652 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962).
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cost 2' less "depreciation.""2 The cost of building a functionally similar
improvement is determined, and then an amount which reflects the
actual physical deterioration and the functional and economic ob-
solescence of the existing improvement is deducted. The replace-
ment cost method has generally been relied upon in Louisiana only
when there are no comparable sales data available by which to
estimate the value of an improvement.23 When faced with such a
situation, the courts have sometimes awarded the replacement cost,
less depreciation, of the improvement plus the comparable sales
value of the land.'
In the absence of comparable sales data, the courts are
sometimes faced with the problem of choosing between an estimate
based on replacement cost and one calculated by income capitaliza-
tion. Generally the lower estimate of the two should be selected as
most indicative of market value under the "build or buy" theory.
The theory is based upon the presumption that a rational person
would choose the most economical way to acquire a commercial
facility-considering whether it would be cheaper to build the struc-
ture or to buy one with a similar income producing capability.25 For
example, if the replacement cost estimate is higher, then it should
be rejected since a rational person would not choose to spend more
in building a commercial establishment than is justified by its in-
come producing potential. Thus, the cost of "buying" the structure's
income potential should reflect its market value.
In certain situations, the standard of just compensation has been
expanded to include damages in addition to the market value of the
land actually taken. Often property not actually taken suffers a
21. The use of replacement cost has a somewhat confusing and inconsistent
history in Louisiana. The courts have often stated that replacement cost is applicable
only to the extent that it is reflected in the "market value" (by which they mean
market value as estimated by comparable sales) of the property. See, e.g., State v.
Barber, 238 La. 587, 592, 115 So. 2d 864, 866 (1959). Although both the replacement
cost approach and the comparable sales approach are valid methods of computing
market value, the preference for the comparable sales approach in Louisiana is so
strong that it is often confused with market value itself. See M. DAKIN & M. KLEIN,
supra note 12, at 154-56 & 244-54. See also text at note 15, supro.
22. It is the estimation of depreciation that presents the greatest difficulty in
calculating replacement cost. Rather than looking to depreciation developed for account-
ing purposes, the appraiser must estimate the actual decline in value caused by
physical deterioration and functional and economic obsolescence. See M. DAKIN & M.
KLEIN, supra note 12, at 256-62.
23. See note 21, supra.
24. E.g., Housing Auth. of New Orleans v. Waters, 233 La. 259, 96 So. 2d 560
(1957).
25. M. DAKIN & M. KLEIN, supra note 12, at 240, citing 1 J. BONBRIGHT, VALUATION
OF PROPERTY 159-61 (1937).
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decline in market value.due to the expropriation of a portion of the
same tract. Such losses are generally called "severance damages"
and are normally measured by comparing the market value of the
remaining property immediately before the expropriation with its
value immediately after the expropriation. 8 However, Louisiana
courts have sometimes awarded the cost to repair such damages. 7
For example, an office building would suffer severance damages if
its parking lot were expropriated. The court would probably award
the cost of building a new parking lot under the cost-to-repair ra-
tionale if this cost were less than the decline in market value caused
by the taking."
Of course, these valuation concepts have been used in conjunc-
tion with the traditional notion of just compensation. But article I,
section 4 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 effected substantial
changes in expropriation law, most of which are apparently aimed at
protecting the interests of property owners." Potentially the most
far reaching change was the inclusion of the phrase, "the owner
shall be compensated to the full extent of his loss." Although section
4 retains the phrase "just compensation," 0 the courts have looked to
the new phraseology as the measure or .standard for compensation.81
26. "The measure of damages, if any, to the defendant's remaining property is
determined on a basis of immediately before and immediately after the taking, taking
into consideration the effects of the completion of the project in the manner proposed
or planned." LA. R.S. 48:453(B) (Supp. 1976).
27. M. DAKIN & M. KLEIN. supra note 12, at 82-85.
28. Id. at 82.
29. For example, it specifically grants the option of a jury trial in expropriation
cases and restricts the power of private entities authorized by law to expropriate to
projects which involve "a public and necessary purpose." See note 2, supra. See
generally Hargrave, The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974,
35 LA. L. REV. 1, 10-20 (1974); Jenkins, The Declaration of Rights, 21 Loy. L. REV. 9,
19-27 (1975). It is of interest to note that there may be a national trend toward greater
protection of property owners' rights in expropriation matters. Section 4 itself is
modeled at least in part on article II, section 29 of the Montana Constitution of 1972
which provides for "just compensation to the full extent of the loss" and for reasonable
attorneys' fees. Also, on the federal level, 42 U.S.C. § 4601-55 requires that each state
set up an administrative procedure for allocating relocation assistance to be provided
with federally funded projects that require expropriation. The Louisiana legislature
has established that procedure in Revised Statutes 38:3101-09. Finally the Uniform
Eminent Domain Code now provides for compensation for any loss of goodwill caused
by the taking. UNIFORM EMINENT DOMAIN CODE art. 10, § 1016. However, this trend
toward greater concern for the rights of the property owner is not universal. See note
72, infra.
30. See note 2, supra.
31. E.g., State v. Constant, 359 So. 2d 666, 671-72 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978), rev'd,
369 So. 2d 699 (La. 1979); State v. Champagne, 356 So. 2d 1136, 1140 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1978).
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The understanding of the constitutional convention delegates
seemed to be that the new standard for compensatory damages
should encompass intangible and consequential losses to the owner
that are unrelated to the value of his property.2 Speakers at the
convention specifically mentioned moving costs and the costs of
reestablishing one's business as compensable items.3 One observer
has concluded that "[i]n any event, the convention debate tends to
confirm the . . . concept of full compensation as putting one 'in
equivalent financial circumstances after the taking,' including items
not compensable under existing law."'"
However, the appellate courts' interpretations of section 4 left
the meaning of the new constitutional language in doubt. The third
circuit interpreted the new standard of full compensation as requir-
ing that the owner be placed in "as good a position pecuniarily" as if
the expropriation had not taken place.16 In Louisiana Power & Light
Co. v. Caldwell,"' the first circuit held that article I, section 4 did not
expand the measure of compensation beyond market value. 7
However, in State v. Constant,38 the first circuit reversed itself, find-
ing that "the Article broadens the scope and concept of the measure
of damages recoverable in expropriation cases."3 9 The court then
went on to say that "the provision envisions recovery for business
losses, moving expenses and other intangibles in a proper case and
upon adequate proof of such losses."'" But the circuit court felt that
no such proof had been presented.'1
The supreme court was thus faced with the task of providing a
definitive reading of the new language. In Constant the state had
expropriated the shelled and bulkheaded parking and loading area
32. The convention debate referred to things "which, perhaps in the past may
have been considered damnum absque injuria [non-compensable], such as cost of
removal," cost of business relocation, and attorneys' fees and court costs. 6 RECORDS OF
THE LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1973: CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS, Aug.
30, 1973, at 1031 [hereinafter cited as RECORDS]; 7 RECORDS OF THE LOUISIANA CONSTITU-
TIONAL CONVENTION OF 1973: CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS. Sept. 13, 1973, at 1240-41. See
also Jenkins, supra note 29, at 23.
33. See 7 RECORDS, supra note 32.
34. Hargrave, supra note 29, at 16.
35. State v. Champagne, 356 So. 2d 1136, 1140 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977); State v.
Alexandria Volkswagen, Inc., 348 So. 2d 176, 178 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977). This "as good
a position pecuniarily" language was sometimes used by Louisiana courts even before
1974. See, e.g., State v. Ragusa, 234 La. 51, 52, 99 So. 2d 20, 21 (1958).
36. 353 So. 2d 371 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977).
37. Id. at 375.
38. 359 So. 2d 666 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978), rev'd, 369 So. 2d 699 (La. 1979).
39. Id. at 672.
40. Id.
41. The first circuit actually reduced the award of the trial court. Id.
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which provided access to the marina's boat slip and which was in-
dispensable to the business operations of the defendants.' 2 The
defendants had engaged in several interdependent business enter-
prises, such as gasoline sales and crewboat rentals, on the site.
Moreover, the marina, as the only facility which provided access to a
certain swampland oil production area, had a strong competitive ad-
vantage in the crewboat rental business.'" Because of the unique
location of the marina, no true comparables existed from which to
estimate the value of the site as a marina facility."
The supreme court began its analysis by approving the lower
court's finding that the new language was intended to broaden the
scope of compensatory damages in expropriation cases and by agree-
ing that the new standard should "permit the owner to remain in
equivalent financial circumstances after the taking."'5 Under this
new standard the court found that the replacement cost method
represented, "perhaps, the most direct and sensible means [of
calculating] the unique value of the loading area to . ..[the land-
owners'] commercial operations conducted at the site.""' The court
felt that it was "not constitutionally significant" that the award ex-
ceeded the market value of the land comprising the entire tract.'7 It
held that once the defendants have established a reasonable
measure of their loss, the burden shifts to the expropriator to show
that replacement would not be justified by the income potential of
the marina." The court then refused to subtract an amount equal to
what it called the "theoretical" depreciation of the loading area, find-
ing that the state had failed to show any functional or economic ob-
solescence and that the defendants had shown that the im-
provements would last indefinitely if properly maintained.'9
The result reached by the supreme court in Constant arguably
could have been reached under the pre-1974 jurisprudence. The
court could have characterized the award as the cost to repair the
loss of access to the boat slip. 0 In fact the trial court had treated
the case as one involving compensation for such severance
42. 369 So. 2d 699, 704 (La. 1979).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 703.
45. Id. at 701.
46. Id. at 705.
47. Id. at 702. This statement is crucial since it evidences that the award can ex-
ceed the market value, although arguably the award did not exceed the market value
in this particular case. See note 21, supra, and see text at notes 50-54, infra.
48. 369 So. 2d at 705.
49. Id. at 706-07.
50. See text at notes 27-28, supra.
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damages. 1 Alternatively, the court could have justified the use of
replacement cost simply by pointing out that no reliable comparable
sales or income data were available, therefore leaving only replace-
ment cost by which to compute the market value of the land as
utilized as a marina.2 Although the opinion calls for compensation to
the landowner for any loss suffered by him,58 the award did not in-
clude any consequential losses to the owner that were completely
unrelated to the value of the property. For example, no mention was
made of the profits that the property owners will be forced to
forego while the marina is being reconstructed. Apparently the
supreme court agreed with the first circuit that no proof of such ad-
ditional losses was presented."'
Rather than attempting to justify its decision on more tradi-
tional grounds, the court chose instead to explain its holding in
terms of the new constitutional requirement that the landowner be
compensated "to the full extent of his loss." That the market value
standard must be expanded upon in light of the new constitutional
language was made clear by the court's statement that "it is not
constitutionally significant that the award to them will exceed the
market value of the property . . . ."" The court justified this award
in excess of the "surface value of the land,"" because the excess
represented the "value of the loading area to their commercial
operations.""7 The holding thus represents a departure from the
"res" concept; it recognizes that the value of the property must be
considered in relation to the owner and to his business.58
Although the opinion makes it clear that the damages in ex-
propriation cases may well exceed the market value of the property
taken, it does not follow that the market value standard will be
abandoned. It must be remembered that the "market value" figures
rejected in the instant case were not based on the sales of com-
parable marina property.55 Truly comparable sales of similar com-
mercial properties should more adequately reflect the value of the
property in relation to the business. Thus when truly comparable
sales data are available, the courts seem highly likely to retain their
51. Transcript of Proceedings Before Seventeenth Judicial District (Reasons for
Judgment) at 8, State v. Constant, 369 So. 2d 699 (La. 1979).
52. See notes 21-24, supra, and accompanying text.
53. 369 So. 2d at 702. See note 47, supr, and accompanying text.
54. See note 41, supra.
55. 369 So. 2d at 702. It is arguable, of course, whether the award did in fact ex-
ceed market value. See text at notes 50-54, supra.
56. Id. at 704.
57. Id. at 705.
58. See text at notes 7-8, supra.
59. See text at notes 42-44, supra.
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strong preference for this method of computing the market value of
the property." Then, under the new constitutional requirement, they
must find other methods to calculate the extent of any incidental or
consequential damages suffered by the property owner in addition
to the loss of the property."
Since it is the loss to the owner that must be compensated, it
logically follows that the owner should be able to demonstrate the
extent of his loss in any reasonable manner. Therefore, the court re-
jected the state's contention that the loss of value to the owner in
excess of the surface value of the property can be shown only
through the income capitalization approach. 2 However, this does not
mean that the court would have rejected an income capitalization
estimate if it had been lower than the replacement cost. The "build
or buy" principle"2 should still be viable under the new standard for
compensation. For example, if the capitalized income value of the
facility were found to be less than the cost of replacing the facility,
then reconstruction would not be economically justifiable. Although
the owners would be deprived of their property, the capitalized
value of its income stream would be the property's financial
equivalent and would thus place the property owners in "equivalent
financial circumstances."
Although the award in Constant did not include compensation
for any consequential or incidental losses truly unrelated to the
value of the property, 5 the opinion did evidence the increased con-
cern for the protection of the property owner mandated by article I,
section 4. For example, the court, in accepting the defendants' con-
tention that replacement cost was one reasonable method of
demonstrating the extent of their loss, shifted the burden of proof
to the state to show that some other method more accurately
60. The historical preference for the comparable sales method is well established.
See, e.g., State v. Kornman, 336 So. 2d 220, 223-24 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976), and cases
cited therein.
61. For a listing of typical damages sustained in addition to the loss of the prop-
erty, see note 11, supra.
62. 369 So. 2d at 705.
63. See text at note 25, supra.
64. Thus, if the state expropriated a commercial building suitable only for use in a
relatively unprofitable business, it should not be expected to pay for the replacement
cost of a building that should not rationally be replaced. On the other hand, if the
replacement cost were lower than the income capitalization estimate, then an award of
the replacement cost would be the most economical way of returning the property
owner to his prior financial position. See M. DAKIN & M. KLEIN, supra note 12, at 212;
Searles, The Legal and Appraisal Aspects of Speciality Properties, in A PRACTICAL
GUIDE TO THE LEGAL AND APPRAISAL ASPECTS OF CONDEMNATION 65, 70 (1969).
65. See text at notes 53-54, supra.
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reflected the loss.6 The decision also demonstrated the onerous
nature of the state's burden of proof in showing that depreciation
had actually reduced the economic value of the property to the
owners. 7  In addition, the court was concerned with the
"compensation-lag of protracted judicial proceedings" and the in-
creased expense this would cause the landowners in rebuilding their
marina." Accordingly the court cited the effect of inflation on
building costs as a factor further justifying its refusal to subtract
depreciation. 9
The concern that the landowner should not be caused to suffer
any consequential or incidental loss is further borne out by the
court's pronouncement that the property owner must be maintained
in "equivalent financial circumstances."7 The language of section 4
itself is very clear in this respect: the property owner must be com-
pensated to the "full extent of his loss."7' Taken as a whole, the case
clearly repudiates the traditional public policy argument that a land-
owner may be required to suffer financially in order to encourage
public improvements."2
If compensation awards are no longer to be restricted to the
losses reflected in the value of the property, then just what limits
do remain? It is interesting to note that the opinion in the instant
case uses phrases such as "economic losses, 7.. "as good a position
66. 369 So. 2d at 706-07. At least under the "quick-taking" statutes, LA. R.S.
48:441-60 (Supp. 1954 & 1977), the burden had been on the landowner to "prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the fair market value of his land is greater than
the highway department's estimate" (the dollar amount of which has been deposited in
the registry of the court). M. DAKIN & M. KLEIN, supra note 12, at 370-73. The burden
of proof issue seldom arises under the general expropriation statutes. Id. at 373-75.
67. See text at note 49, supra. By grounding its refusal to subtract depreciation
upon the factual determination that no depreciation had been proved, the supreme
court in effect rejected the dissenting appellate judge's contention that to subtract
depreciation from replacement cost would always be to deny the landowner his right
to be placed in equivalent financial circumstances. Compare 369 So. 2d at 706-07 with
359 So. 2d at 673 (Lottinger, J., concurring and dissenting).
68. 369 So. 2d at 706.
69. Id.
70. The court quoted the language of the appellate court approvingly. Id at 701.
71. See note 2, supra.
72. See text at notes 9-11, supra. As a good example of the continuing vitality of
the public policy argument in cases arising under constitutional provisions which do
not go beyond the "just compensation" standard, consider the following statement by
Justice Marshall: "Respondent, like other private owners, is not entitled to recover for
non-transferable values arising from its unique need for the property. To the extent
denial of such an award departs from the indemnity principle, it is justified by the
necessity for a workable measure of valuation." United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land,
99 S. Ct. 1854, 1860 (1979).
73. 369 So. 2d at 703.
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pecuniarily,"74 and "equivalent financial circumstances."75 Thus com-
pensation may be restricted to damages that can be measured objec-
tively in pecuniary terms."7 At least one convention delegate ex-
pressed the belief that claims "for mental anguish, for hurt feelings"
and other "wholly speculative" intangible damages should not be
compensable.77 The Third Circuit Court of Appeal has already denied
a landowner recovery for what he subjectively felt to be his loss."8
However, the constitutional convention debates emphasizing the loss
to the owner still leave the issue at least partly in doubt."
Although the decision in State v. Constant does not clearly
specify just what new types of damages must be included in order
to compensate the landowner to the full extent of his loss, it does
lay the groundwork for new jurisprudence on expropriation compen-
sation. The decision establishes what almost surely was the intent of
the constitutional convention delegates: that the scope of damages in
expropriation cases should be expanded. By requiring that the prop-
erty owner be placed in equivalent financial circumstances, the deci-
sion effectively holds that the landowner cannot be required to suf-
fer pecuniarily in order to encourage public improvements. The opin-
ion recognizes that it is the loss of value to the owner that must be
compensated, not merely the physical value of the property. With
this characterization of the loss, the decision clears the way for the
recognition and compensation of other consequential or incidental
losses suffered by the landowner when his property is expropriated.
Allen Crigler
74. Id. at 702.
75. Id. at 701.
76. This focus on business and financial losses might not be appropriate in some
situations. Certain "specialty properties" (such as churches and schools) may produce
no income and have only a nominal market value. See generally Searles, supra note 64.
The author suggests that an award of replacement cost would then be appropriate if
the structure rationally would be replaced. Id. at 70. Louisiana cases on the subject
have been inconclusive. E.g., State ,. Chicago, R.I. & P. R.R. Co., 357 So. 2d 1224, 1226
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1978).
77. 6 RECORDS. supra note 32, Aug. 30, 1973, at 1064 (statement of Delegate
Leigh). However, the amendment he was speaking in favor of (one to change the wor-
ding to "the loss" rather than "his loss" and to delete the provision for jury trials) was
defeated. Id. at 1066.
78. State v. Johnson, 369 So. 2d 191 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979); State v. Champagne,
356 So. 2d 1136, 1140 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978).
79. For example, Woody Jenkins, one of the moving forces behind the adoption of
section 4, has since written that compensation is "to be determined subjectively with
emphasis on the value placed on the property by the owner." Jenkins, supra note 29,
at 24 (emphasis added).
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